List of Attachments

[Tab D]

[D-1]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

JUL 16 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

During the Viet Nam War the United States was not a party to any treaty prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.

- The United States was never a party to the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases of 29 July 1899 (which is now considered obsolete).

- President Nixon submitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (commonly known as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol) to the Senate for ratification on 11 August 1970, but it did not come into force for the United States until 10 April 1975.

- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention) was opened for signature in 1993 and was ratified by the United States in 1997.

Since World War II the United States has taken the position that the first use of lethal chemical weapons is contrary to customary international law. On this basis, from World War II until U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the United States adhered to a "no-first-use" policy under which the United States would not resort to the use of lethal chemical weapons unless they were first used by our enemies. (See the attached extract from AFP 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. Published in 1976, it accurately states the US understanding of its law of war obligations during the Viet Nam War.)

[Signature]

David A. Koplo
Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs)

[D-2]

Judge Advocate General Activities

INTERNATIONAL LAW -- THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS

This pamphlet is for the information and guidance of judge advocates and others particularly concerned with international law requirements applicable during armed conflict. It furnishes references and suggests solutions to a variety of legal problems but is not directive in nature. As an Air Force pamphlet, it does not promulgate official US Government policy although it does refer to US, DOD and Air Force policies.

Chapter l--The International Law of Armed Conflict

Scope of Publication
The Law of Armed Conflict: Its Context
Determinants of the Law
Views on the Law of Armed Conflict
Application of Law
Observance of the Law
Footnotes

Chapter 2--Status of Airspace and Aircraft

Airspace Defined
Control of Airspace
Control of Outer Space
Military Aircraft
Access by Military Aircraft to Airspace During Peacetime
Access to Airspace by Military Aircraft During Hostilities
Footnotes

Chapter 3--Combatants, Noncombatants, and Civilians

Introduction
Combatants
Unlawful Combatants
Noncombatants
Civilians
Footnotes

Chapter 4 Conflict in the Air and at Sea

Introduction
Military Aircraft
Civil Aircraft
Armed Conflict at Sea
Footnotes

Chapter 5--Aerial Bombardment

Introduction

__________

OPR: JACI
DISTRIBUTION: F

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AFP 110-31   19 November 1976

between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

(2) Convention On The Prohibition Of  the Development, Production, And Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And On Their Destruction, 1972.

Article I. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict

Article II. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible, but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

Article IV. Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

b. Biological Weapons.⁹ International law prohibits biological weapons or methods of warfare whether they are directed against persons, animals or plants. The wholly indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of biological weapons has resulted in the condemnation of biological weapons by the international community, and the practice of states in refraining from their use in warfare has confirmed this rule The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits also the development, preparation, stockpiling and supply to others of such weapons.

c. Chemical Weapons: Gas Warfare. The first use of lethal chemical weapons is now regarded as unlawful in armed conflicts. During World War II President Roosevelt in response to reports that the enemy was seriously contemplating the use of gas warfare. stated "Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. . . We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.''¹¹ This United States position has been reaffirmed on many occasions by the United States as well as confirmed by resolutions in various international forums. On 11 August 1970, when the 1925 Geneva Protocol was resubmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent prior to United States ratification, President Nixon stated that the United States would ratify the Protocol with an appropriate reservation that "would permit the retaliatory use by the United States of chemical weapons and agents." The 1925 Geneva Protocol came into force for the United States on 10 April 1975.

d. Anti-plant Agents.¹³ Anti-plant agents are chemicals which possess a high potential for destroying plants. Thus, they can limit the production of food or defoliate vegetation used either as a raw material (trees for pulp) or as a cover (trees for camouflage). These agents include herbicides that kill or inhibit the growth of plants; plant growth

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AFP 110-31    19 November 1976

regulators that either regulate or inhibit plant growth, sometimes causing plant death; and those which dry up plant foliage. US policy on the use of herbicides in war is as follows:

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within US bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters . . . The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of any . . . chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance (Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975, issued by Gerald R Ford. President of the United States).

The legal effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy It is not intended to interpret the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the US that the Protocol does not restrain the use of chemical herbicides as such.

e. Riot Control Agents.¹⁴ Riot control agents are chemicals. such as sprays and gases, which do not cause permanent injury and have no harmful effects other than temporarily disabling the person to whom they are applied. US policy on the use of riot control agents in war is as follows:

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, . . . first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct US military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations. . .

The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents. . in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval. in advance. (Executive Order No. 11850. 8 April 1975, issued by Gerald R. Ford. President of the United States).

The legal effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy. It is not intended to interpret the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the US that the Protocol does not restrain the use of riot control agents as such.

f. Poison.¹⁵ Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations provides: ''It is especially forbidden . . . To employ poison or poisoned weapons.'' Poisons are biological or chemical substances causing death or disability with permanent effects when. in even small quantities. they are ingested. enter the lungs or bloodstream, or touch the skin. The longstanding customary prohibition against poison is based on their uncontrolled character and the inevitability of death or permanent disability as well as on a traditional belief that it is treacherous to use poison.

6-5. Nuclear Weapons.¹⁶ The use of explosive nuclear weapons. whether by air, sea or land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing international law in the absence of any international rule of law restricting their employment. Nuclear weapons can be directed against military objectives as can conventional weapons. However, decisions to employ nuclear weapons emanate from a nation' s highest level of government. The authority of United States forces to employ nuclear weapons resides solely with the President. Moreover, these weapons have

[End Tab D]

[Tab E]

[E-1]

DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION OFFICE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-2400

15 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Allegations that U.S. Forces Used Lethal Gas to Kill Defectors

In support of your inquiry into Operation Tailwind, enclosed please find the following:

(1) Summary of the results of my search of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) publications, including titles and translations of selected extracts from three PAVN publications.

(2) Talking points about:

- the two known American defectors, and

- three American servicemen who are frequent subjects of false stories about American defectors.

(3) Background note concerning the question of possible foreign advisors to PAVN troops in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.

I hope this information proves helpful. Please contact me if you have questions.

[Signature]

ROBERT J. DESTATTE
Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Division
Research & Analysis Directorate

3 Enclosures
as stated

[E-2]

SEARCH OF PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM PUBLICATIONS
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

I reviewed the People's Army of Vietnam's (PAVN) official history of military operations on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the PAVN's official history of the 968th Volunteer Infantry Division, and the PAVN's official history of its Chemical Command (see below for titles and extracts).

KEY POINTS:

- These three official PAVN accounts make no mention of any possible use of lethal chemicals by American or allied forces during the war.

- The official PAVN history of its operations on the Ho Chi Minh trail makes no mention of any possible use of any type of lethal chemical weapons by American or allied forces during the war.

- The history of 968th Volunteer Infantry Division, the unit responsible for the defense of the area in which Operation Tailwind took place, makes no specific mention of any engagement in September 1970, nor any mention of the use of chemical agents by US and allied forces.

- The history of PAVN Chemical Command mentions American use of only defoliants, incendiary, and CS type chemical weapons in Laos.

- The history of the PAVN Chemical Command mentions that the PAVN's seizure of American chemical weapons (specifically CS grenades) and equipment (e.g., gas masks) and related documents during Operation Lam Son 719 in early 1971 in Laos contributed significantly to Hanoi's "political and diplomatic struggle." From this statement we might infer that Hanoi would have exploited any American attempt to employ lethal chemicals.

- Primary missions of PAVN chemical troops (history of the PAVN Chemical Command):

- guidance to combat arms units on how to cope with chemicals the enemy employed

- distribution of gas masks and other equipment for defense against chemicals

- generate smoke in support of deception and concealment operations

- flame thrower support to combat arms units

- collect and exploit enemy chemical munitions and countermeasures equipment

DISCUSSION AND EXTRACT TRANSLATIONS:

I reviewed the following three books to see whether PAVN's official histories mention any possible use of lethal chemicals by US forces in Laos during the Vietnam war. I found no mention of lethal chemicals. I translated a few relevant passages that you might find useful.

1. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the War of Resistance Against

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America], written by Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Phuong, Directorate of Rear Services, People's Army of Vietnam, 1st reprinting with revisions and additions, Hanoi, 1988.

pp. 337-358, contains descriptions of various bombs American forces employed in Laos, and PAVN countermeasures, and statistical charts depicting total numbers of bombs by type, year, and general location. No mention of any type of chemical weapon.

2. Su Doan 968 [968th Division], published by the Culture and Information Office of the 968th Division, Quang Tri, 1990. The 968th Volunteer Infantry Division was responsible for defense of the Ho Chi Minh trail corridor in southern Laos, including the area in which Operation Tailwind took place.

pp. 60-90, contains descriptions of actions in the Saravane Province, Laos during 1970. The passage contains a relatively detailed account of actions during April-June 1970. The passage does not mention any engagement in September 1970. The only mention of American commando operations [i.e., MACVSOG] is a sentence on page 88 that notes during the 1970 rainy season we (the US) inserted 35 commando teams by helicopter in the regions bordering the Bolovens Plateau.

I found no mention of American or allied use of chemical agents in the PAVN history of the 968th Division.

3. Lich Su Bo Doi Hoa Hoc, Tap 1, 1958-1975, so thao [History of the Chemical Command, Volume 1,1958-1975, draft], written by Le Huong and Dang Xuan Khoi and revised by Nguyen Thanh Huu, published by the Headquarters of the Chemical Command, People's Army of Vietnam, Hanoi, 1988. Chapter 2, pp. 167-240, covers the activities of the PAVN Chemical Command in B4 Front (southern Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province, South Vietnam), and B5 Front (demilitarized zone, northern Quang Tri Province, and the Highway 9 corridor), and southern Laos.

p. 198. The history of the PAVN Chemical Command devotes a total of two short paragraphs to events during 1970. Only one of these two paragraphs is devoted to events in Laos: "In May 1970, the 91st [Chemical] Company was attached to the 141st Regiment, 312th Infantry Division in Laos. The company was organized into three cells that accompanied the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and the 19th Company which fought a number of engagements at Phou Nha Thau and Phou Then [Plain of Jars area], but their effectiveness was low because the terrain did not permit the flame throwers to be used to their full potential."

p. 202 [Feb-Mar 1971]. "With regard to chemicals, the tactical operations plan of Major General Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the [RVNAF] operation, directed the use of various chemical weapons (CBU 19 bombs, BLU 52A and BLU 52B 70mm chemical rockets). One hundred percent of enemy forces were equipped with gas masks before the operation, each man was equipped with 1-2 CS smoke or powder grenades; the basic load for each M19 gun included 6-12 CS rounds; each company had 34 type E8 CS canister launchers; and, additionally, they still had the 40mm CS launch tubes."

p. 203 [Feb-Mar 1971]. "The enemy carried out 15 chemical attacks on our positions on high points 31 1, 351 , 402, 229, 863, and 684; four attacks on our artillery positions; 14 attacks on our troop bivouac areas, command posts, supply points, artillery observer posts, etc..., but the chemical troops deployed with our units dealt with chemical contingencies calmly and quickly, insuring our troops could fight continuously for a protracted period.

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"Chemical contingencies were discovered through reconnaissance and the effects were overcome immediately, giving our troops confidence. In the various units, the seizure of enemy documents and chemical equipment was of great significance for technical research and training, and for the political and DIPLOMATIC struggle [emphasis added]. We seized 187 gas masks, three CS dispensers (E8), one 40mm CS launch tube, 11 XM25 grenades, 62 XM54 grenades, and two enemy documents that spoke about our chemical equipment."

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TALKING POINTS ON DEFECTORS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

QUESTION: "How many U.S. military personnel defected to communist forces in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict, 1963-1975?"

ANSWER: Only two American military personnel were known to have defected to Communist forces during the war. (See below for names and details.)

QUESTION: "During the war there were reports of a so-called "salt-and-pepper" team operating with Communist forces. What is the basis for these reports?"

ANSWER: Some reports of Americans operating with Communist forces no doubt are based on sightings of USMC Private Robert R. Garwood, one of the two American military personnel who were known to have defected to communist forces. There is circumstantial evidence that Robert R. Garwood armed with an AK 47 assault rifle occasionally accompanied PAVN troops in the field. Robert R. Garwood and US Army Private McKinley are the only Americans who are known to have operated with Communist forces during the war.

QUESTION: Is it possible Russian advisors might have been working with People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations, and members of the MACVSOG force might have mistook the Russians for American defectors.

ANSWER: We have seen no evidence that could support a belief that Russians or other Western advisors (e.g., Cubans) served with PAVN forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.

DEFECTOR MCKINLEY NOLAN (Case 9950)

Private Mckinley Nolan, U. S. Army, was dropped from the rolls as a deserter when he failed to return to his unit after he was released from the Long Binh Military Stockade on 8 November 1967. Taking along his common-law Vietnamese-Khmer wife and her two children, Nolan defected to the National Liberation Front (NLF). He and his wife resided with Vietnamese Communist forces at various locations along both sides of the border between Cambodia and northern Tay Ninh Province, South Vietnam, until approximately November 1973.

In approximately November 1973, Nolan and his family left the Vietnamese and joined Khmer Rouge forces. They lived with Khmer Rouge forces in the vicinity of Memot town until at least mid-1974. Several sources report that Khmer Rouge forces killed Nolan. Although separate sources report different dates, the Khmer Rouge killed Nolan apparently sometime between late 1974 and mid-1975.

DEFECTOR ROBERT R. GARWOOD (Case 0155)

Private Robert R. Garwood, USMC, disappeared from his unit near Danang City, South Vietnam, on 28 September 1965. Survivors of the Communist B.1 Front POW camp (also known as the Military Region 5 POW camp), located in northwestern Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam, reported that Garwood lived with the cadre in the camp--not with the POWs and had complete freedom of movement. Communist authorities offered Garwood release in May 1967; however, he declined to accept release stating that he wanted to stay with Communist forces and assist them in their cause for freedom. In the autumn of 1969, Garwood moved to North Vietnam, where he lived until he returned to the United States in March 1979.

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Several hundred former officers of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces who were detained in Communist re-education camps in North Vietnam after the war and later immigrated to the United States, told American officials they encountered Garwood as a member of the staff of the re-education camps near Yen Bai Town, about 80 kilometers northwest of Hanoi, between mid-1976 and the autumn of 1978.

After he returned to the U.S., Garwood was tried by a military courts martial and found guilty of collaborating with the enemy and having assaulted an American POW.

SALT-AND-PEPPER TEAM:

The stories of a so-called "salt-and-pepper" team illustrates how persons who exploit the POW/MIA issue defame American servicemen who died in Vietnam, and defame the families of those servicemen.

- USMC Privates Robert L. Greer and Fred T. Schreckengost have been targets of this story

- These two Marines disappeared on 7 Jun 1964

- Both are Caucasian

- They rented motorbikes to tour an area near Danang City during off-duty time

- Credible reports of capture and death received shortly after they disappeared

- Their motorbikes were found submerged in a canal not long after incident

- In 1990 specialists from PACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting investigated

- Witnesses led JTF-FA team to burial site, remains recovered in Nov 1990

- Suggestions these two Marines were defectors unjustly defames them and their families

USMC PRIVATE EARL CLYDE WEATHERMAN

- USMC Private Earl Clyde Weatherman is a frequent target of false stories about defectors

- Pvt Weatherman disappeared after he escaped from a brig near Danang City on 8 Nov 1967

- Sometime after he escaped from the brig Communist forces captured him

- He was confined with other Americans in mountains of northeast Quang Ngai Province

- Seizing an opportunity, he and another USMC prisoner assaulted a guard, took his weapon, and escaped.

- The two escaped men traveled about two kilometers before pursuers caught them. - The other escaped prisoner witnessed pursuers kill Private Weatherman.

- In 1994 Vietnamese witnesses led American investigators to the site where they buried Private Weatherman.

- Although Private Weatherman might have encountered disciplinary problems before he was captured, he acted heroically after becoming a prisoner. He resisted his captors and tried to escape when he saw an opportunity.

- Suggestions Private Weatherman was a defector unjustly defames him and his family.

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BACKGROUND NOTE RE FOREIGN ADVISORS TO PAVN

One of the questions the CNN/TIME story about Operation Tailwind suggests is the question of whether Russian or other Soviet bloc advisors might have been working with People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations, and whether members of the MACVSOG force might have mistook those advisors for American defectors.

We have seen no evidence that could support a belief that Russians or other Soviet bloc advisors (e.g., Cubans) served with PAVN forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations. In fact, available information about the PAVN's operations suggests strongly that Russian and other Soviet bloc advisors did not operate in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.

Several sources of knowledge give us insight into PAVN's wartime operations.

First, in the course of their in-country investigations and oral history interviews to search for information about the fate of American servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the war, the PACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and its predecessor, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, have interviewed hundreds of PAVN veterans.

Second, in recent years the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs Office's (DPMO) Joint Commission Support Directorate has interviewed several Soviet veterans who served as military advisors in Vietnam.

Third, specialists in the JTF-FA and DPMO have reviewed hundreds of official histories that PAVN published about the war.

Fourth, wartime intelligence American and allied forces gathered from prisoners, ralliers, captured documents, signal intercepts, etc.

The preponderance of information gathered from these four sources reveals that Soviet military advisors seldom ventured south of the coastal town of Vinh, located in Nghe An Province in northern Vietnam, about midway between Hanoi and the old demilitarized zone. To the best of our knowledge, the few Soviet bloc military advisors that ventured south of Vinh were advisors to PAVN air defense units. With two possible exceptions, to the best of our knowledge, Soviet bloc military advisors did not venture outside of northern Vietnam.

The first possible exception would have occurred during the early 1 960s when the PAVN used fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to move personnel and supplies into a few sites in northeastern and central Laos. Soviet bloc pilots and aircrews might have participated in some of those flights.

The other possible exception would have occurred during PAVN's defensive campaign against Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, in about February-April 1971. This was an American supported offensive by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces' (RVNAF) along the Highway 9 corridor between the Vietnamese border outpost at Khe Sanh and the Laotian town of Tchepone. One former Soviet advisor to a PAVN air defense regiment told American interviewers that he and other members of his small advisor team believed they might have ventured a short distance into an area of Laos located between the Ban Karai Pass and the town of Tchepone for a brief period in early 1971.

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Toward the end of the war, Cuba sent a small group of construction engineers to Vietnam to help with road building projects; however, this was long after Operation Tailwind. During the war Cuba also posted a diplomatic representative to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, which was located in Cambodia. It is unlikely any Cubans ever ventured into Laos in support of or as advisors to the PAVN.

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[End Tab E]

[Tab F]

[F-1]

                             OPERATION TAILWIND

SIR, I AM LT VAN BUSKIRK FROM MACSOG AT KONTUM.  I WAS A PLATOON LEADER

DURING OPERATION TAILWIND WHICH ENTERED TARGET AREA TANGO 2 EIGHTEEN KILOMETERS

EAST OF CHAVANE ON 111245Z SEP 70.  THE FORCE COMMITTED WAS 16 US AND 120 SCU.

OUR MISSION WAS TO CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO COLLECT INFORMATION

AND INTELLIGENCE AND TO CREATE A DIVERSION IN SUPPORT OF, AND IN CONSONANCE

WITH, THE CAS LAUNCHED OPERATION GAUNTLET.

TWENTY MINUTES AFTER A 12 MAN PATHFINDER TEAM WAS DELIVERED TO THE LZ BY 2 UH-1

HELICOPTERS, THE MAIN BODY WAS LANDED BY 3 CH-53 HELICOPTERS AT (POINT 1). THERE

WAS NO ENEMY FIRE RECEIVED BY THE PATHFINDER SHIPS, HOWEVER, THE FIRST CH-53

RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES FROM THE LZ.  TWO SCU AND THE

FIRST PLATOON SERGEANT REPORTED SEEING, FROM THE WINDOW OF THE AIRCRAFT JUST

PRIOR TO LANDING, E RUSSIAN MEDIUM TANKS AND TWO 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS MOVING NE

ON ROUTE 966.  THE LZ AND SURROUNDING AREAS HAD BEEN PREPPED WITH "ROCK-EYE"

ARMOR-PIERCING, CLUSTER BOMB UNITS.  ALL THE CH-53 AIRCRAFT RECEIVED MINOR

HITS FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE, BUT DUE POSSIBLE TO THE LZ PREP, ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

WAS NOT OBSERVED FROM THESE POSITIONS KNOWN TO BE IN THE GENERAL AREA.

THE COMPANY MOVED APPROXIMATELY 600 METERS TO THE NW WHEN THE 1ST PLATOON POINT

SQUAD LOCATED AN ENEMY HUT AT POINT 2 WHICH CONTAINED OVER TWO HUNDRED 140 MM

ROCKETS (POINT 2).  TWO SQUADS FROM THE 1ST PLATOON DEPLOYED AND SEARCHED THE

AREA, LOCATING A TOTAL OF 8 HUTS CONTAINING:

     1.  FIVE HUNDRED 140 MM ROCKETS * (START SLIDES) (SLIDE TWO)

     2.  THREE HUNDRED B-40 ROCKETS

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     3.  12,500 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMO.

     4.  APPROXIMATELY 40 BICYCLES.

     5.  THREE HUNDRED 83 MM MORTAR ROUNDS (SLIDE ONE)

     6.  TWO THOUSAND 23 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHELLS (SLIDE ONE)

DURING THIS PERIOD THE ENEMY COULD BE HEARD FIRING SIGNAL SHOTS THROUGHOUT

THE AREA AND AT ONE TIME A FIELD PHONE WAS HEARD RINGING.  THE TWO SQUADS

BROUGHT SAMPLES FROM EACH STRUCTURE FOR PHOTOGRAPHING AND IDENTIFICATION.

THE DEMOLITION EXPERTS SET AN EXPLOSIVE CHARGE WITH A 13 1/3 MINUTE DELAY

FUZE IN EACH OF THE TWO LARGEST STRUCTURES CONTAINING THE 140 MM ROCKETS

AND PLACED A WHITE PHOSPHORUS GRENADE ON EACH CHARGE TO MARK THE LOCATION

FOR THE FAC.  THE COMPANY MOVED NORTH AT 1500 HOURS AND 14 MINUTES LATER

TWO LARGE EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD.  SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD FOR THE

NEXT FIVE HOURS.  THE FAC REPORTED SEEING THE SMOKE FROM THE WHITE PHOSPHORUS

GRENADES AND MARKED THE LOCATION FOR A BOMB STRIKE.

THE COMPANY WAS ENGAGED BY ENEMY FORCES WHICH WERE BY PASSED AT (POINT 3) AND

CONTINUED NW TO A RON SITE AT (POINT 4).  NO ENEMY CONTACT WAS MADE DURING THE

NIGHT.  AS THE COMPANY WAS PREPARING TO MOVE TO THE ROAD THE MORNING OF D + 1

TWO TRACKED VEHICLES, POSSIBLE THE TANKS MENTIONED EARLIER, WERE HEAR MOVING

VERY SLOWLY FROM NORTH TO SOUTH ON ROUTE 966.  THE COMPANY ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY

THE TRACKED VEHICLES WITH LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, HOWEVER, THE TERRAIN BETWEEN

THE COMPANY'S LOCATION AND THE ROAD WAS A SWAMP WHICH PRECLUDED DIRECT OBSERVATION.

AT POINT 5 AN ESTIMATED 40 ENEMY SOLDIERS INITIATED CONTACT WITH THE LEAD ELEMENT.

THE ENEMY FIRED AW WEAPONS, RIFLE GRENADES, B-40 ROCKETS AND A MORTAR.  TWO SQUADS

DEPLOYED FROM 1ST PLATOON AND MANEUVERED AGAINST THE ENEMY.  TAC AIR, ARMED

WITH CBU-25 WAS EXPENDED AGAINST THE ENEMY'S POSITION.  THIS ENGAGEMENT LASTED

OVER ONE HOUR.  THE COMPANY MOVED 500 METERS SE TO A LARGE BOMB CRATER TO PREPARE

                                      2

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AN LZ.  THE ENEMY INITIATED TWO MORE CONTACTS WITH THE COMPANY USING AW FIRE,

B-40 ROCKETS AND THROWING GRENADES.  CURING THESE CONTACTS, WHICH LASTED OVER

TWO HOURS, THE US COMPANY COMMANDER, 1ST PLATOON LEADER, 1ST SERGEANT, MEDIC,

AND 5 SQUAD LEADERS WERE WOUNDED.  THE EXTRACTION WAS NOT COMPLETED DUE TO BAD

WEATHER IN THE AREA.

THE COMPANY WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY ALL NIGHT.  A LARGE ENEMY

FORCE HAD SURROUNDED THE COMPANY AND ATTEMPTED TO BREAK INTO THE PERIMETER.

THE ENEMY FIRED MANY B-40 ROCKETS AND MORTAR ROUNDS, BUT THEIR MAIN ATTACK

WAS WITH HAND GRENADES.  THE 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON EACH REPORTED RECEIVING

300 ENEMY GRENADES IN THEIR DEFENSIVE AREAS AND EACH PLATOON THREW APPROXIMATELY

200 HAND GRENADES BACK AT THE ENEMY.  THE REST OF THE COMPANY REPORTED AN

ESTIMATED 100 EXPLOSIONS CAUSED BY MORTAR ROUNDS, B-40 ROCKETS, AND HADN GRENADES

THAT WERE THROWN OVER THE 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON POSITIONS.  DURING THIS CONTACT,

THE COMPANY HAD ONLY ONE MAN WOUNDED, A US SQUAD LEADER, WHO HAD CRAWLED FROM HIS

FOXHOLE AND ATTEMPTED TO CAPTURE A POW.  THE 1ST PLATOON REPORTED ONLY 1 ENEMY

CONFIRMED KILLED BUT ESTIMATED THAT 35 ENEMY WERE KILLED BY SPECTRE AIRCRAFT

WHICH PROVIDED SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.  THIRD PLATOON REPORTED 30 ENEMY

KILLED BY AIR, IN THEIR SEGMENT OF THE PERIMETER, AND THE 2D PLATOON REPORTED

2 ENEMY KILLED BY AIR AND NO ENEMY KILLED BY GROUND ACTIONS.  NEITHER FORCE

USED SMALL ARMS FIRE DURING THE NIGHT FOR FEAR OF EXPOSING THEIR POSITION.

THE ENEMY USED SIGNAL WHICH THE COMPANY SOON UNDERSTOOD AND WAS ABLE TO WARN

ALL UNITS BY USE OF THE RADIO.

      ONE CLICK OR WHISTLE - MOVE.

      TWO CLICKS OR WHISTLES - THROW GRENADES.

      THREE CLICKS OR WHISTLES - WITHDRAW.

      THE CLICKS WERE MADE BY HITTING TWO PIECES OF BAMBOO TOGETHER.

                                     3

[F-4]

[Partial fax header:]
                                         SHERRY MCCARLEY                          001



THE SPECTRE AIRCRAFT WAS UNABLE TO READ THE SIGNALS FROM THE COMPANIES

TRANSPONDERS OR MINI-PONDERS.  THE PILOT STATE HIS EQUIPMENT WAS OLD,

AND HE ADJUSTED HIS A/C FIRE CONTINUOUSLY FROM THE FLASHES OF B-40

ROCKETS, EXPLODING HAND GRENADES AND TRIP FLARES THAT THE COMPANY REPORTED

TO HIM.  THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT OF D + 1, 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON MEMBERS COULD

HEAR MANY HEAVY OBJECTS BEING DRAGGED AWAY WITHIN 5 METERS OF THEIR

POSITIONS.  AFTER THE A/C WOULD FIRE, THEY COULD HEAR THE ENEMY RUN AND BANG

INTO TREES AS THEY FLED IN PANIC; THEY COULD HEAR SOME CRY OUT AS THEY DIED.

SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THEY COULD HEAR THE SOUND OF HEAVY OBJECTS AGAIN BEING

DRAGGED AWAY FROM THEIR POSITIONS, THEN MORE ENEMY SIGNALS AND INCOMING 

GRENADES.  THE COMPANY ESTIMATE THE AIRCRAFT AS HAVING KILLED A MINIMUM OF

67 ENEMY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.  ON D + 2, 13 SEP, THE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED

TO MOVE TO A NEW LZ FOR EXTRACTION OF THE TWO SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PERSONNEL.

DURING THIS MOVEMENT AN ENEMY SQUAD WAS OBSERVED MOVING TO OCCUPY THE 3RD

PLATOON'S FOXHOLES FROM THE PREVIOUS NIGHT.  1ST PLATOON INITIATED CONTACT

AND HELD THE ENEMY SO THE COMPANY COULD BY-PASS THEM WITH THE WOUNDED.  ANOTHER

ENEMY SQUAD REINFORCED THE FIRST, AND 3 US PERSONNEL AND ONE SUC, MAINTAINED

CONTACT UNTIL THEY COULD BRING TAC AIR TO DESTROY THE ENEMY SQUADS.  THE TAC

AIR WAS SUCCESSFUL ON THE 1ST ENEMY SQUAD AND KILLED APPROXIMATELY HALF OF THE

OTHER SQUAD.  THE 4 MEN REJOINED THE COMPANY ON THE WAY TO THE LZ.  JUST AFTER

ARRIVING AT POINT 8 AN ENEMY SQUAD AGAIN INITIATED CONTACT.  CBU-25 WAS USED

AGAINST THE ENEMY BY TAC AIR.  *  THE COMPANY SECURED THE LZ AT POINT 9 AND

CLEARED TREES AND STUMPS WITH CLAYMORE MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVES.  AT 1255 A

CH-53 ARRIVED TO REMOVE THE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT COULD NOT

LAND DUE TO A TAIL ROTOR BLADE STRIKING A TREE (SHOW BLANK SLIDE).

                                      4

[F-5]

THIS SHIP LATER CRASHED 3 KILOMETERS TO THE NE AT POINT 10 AFTER IT WAS HIT BY

A B-40 ROCKET.  ALL PERSONNEL WERE RESCUED BY A CHASE SHIP.  DURING THIS RESCUE

ACTION EIGHT ENEMY WERE KILLED BY AIR.  THE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED TO ANOTHER

LZ FOR EVACUATION OF WOUNDED.  THE COMPANY HAD TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY 350

METERS WHEN MORE THAN TWO ENEMY SQUADS INITIATED CONTACT AT POINT 11.  THE FIRST

PLATOON ENGAGED THE ENEMY WITH TWO SQUADS AND DIRECTED A SUCCESSFUL TAC AIR STRIKE

WITH CBU-25 ON THE ENEMY POSITION.  THE COMPANY ARRIVED AT THE LZ LOCATION AT

1400 HOURS (POINT 12).  THE FIRST PLATOON LINKED BACK UP WITH THE COMPANY AND

DEPLOYED INTO A REAR AMBUSH FORMATION.  TAC AIR WAS DIRECTED THROUGHOUT THE

AREAS WHERE EARLIER CONTACT HAD OCCURRED.  THE ENEMY DID NOT MAKE CONTACT WITH

THE COMPANY AGAIN UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY.  WHEN BAD WEATHER PREVENTED EVACUATION

OF WOUNDED, THE COMPANY SET UP A DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AT POINT 13.  THE COMPANY

BEGAN MOVEMENT TO ANOTHER LZ AT DAYBREAK.  THE COMPANY WAS OUT OF WATER, HAD USED

MORE THAN HALF THEIR BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION, MOST OF THE US WERE WOUNDED, SOME

TWICE, AND MANY SCU WERE WOUNDED, HOWEVER, ONLY 4 SERIOUSLY.  THE MORALE OF THE

COMPANY WAS EXTREMELY HIGH DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY

THUS FAR.

APPROXIMATELY 600 METERS FROM THE RON SITE, THE UNIT RECEIVED FIRE FROM A B-40

ROCKET AT POINT 14, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND HAND GRENADES.  THE ENEMY WAS ONLY

20 METERS AWAY.

TWO SQUADS DEPLOYED ON LINE FACING THE ENEMY AND RETURNED WHAT SOON BECAME SPORADIC

FIRE.  THE PLATOON LEADER COULD HEAR THE ENEMY TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES, BUT NEITHER

ONE OF HIS INTERPRETERS COULD TRANSLATE WHAT THEY THINK TO BE A LOATIAN DIALECT.

THE PLATOON LEADER CALLED OUT TO THE ENEMY IN ENGLISH TO "CHOI HAU" AND HIS

INTERPRETER CALLED OUT IN VIETNAMESE, BUT EACH TIME THEY CALLED OUT THEIR POSITION

WOULD COME UNDER MORE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE.

                                      % 5

[F-6]

[Fax header:]
06/16/98  TUE 13:26 FAX 9106860074             SHERRY MCCARLEY                     001



THE COMPANY COULD HAVE BY-PASSED THE ENEMY, HOWEVER, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME

THE ENEMY HAD INITIATED DIRECT FRONTAL ATTACK.  BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION

WE BELIEVED THE ENEMY WAS TRYING TO PROTECT A VALUABLE LOCATION.  WE REQUESTED

PERMISSION FROM THE COMPANY COMMANDER TO ASSAULT THE POSITION.  THE COMPANY

COMMANDER APPROVED AND TWO SQUADS, YELLING, SCREAMING, AND FIRING THEIR WEAPONS

ASSAULTED THE ENEMY POSITION.

SOME OF THE ENEMY RETURNED THE FIRE AND OTHERS BROKE AND RAN.  THE TWO SQUADS

KILLED THOSE REMAINING AND DROVE MANY INTO A BN SIZE BASE CAMP (POINT 15).  THE

ASSAULT CONTINUED AND THE ENEMY BROKE INTO THREE DIRECTIONS.  THE RESERVE SQUAD

ENGAGED THOSE THAT WERE FLEEING IN THEIR DIRECTION.  DUE TO THE CANOPY THINNING

OUT, THE BASE CAMP WAS MARKED WITH A WHITE PHOSPHORUS GRENADE AND TACK AIR WAS

BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY SOLDIERS FLEEING TO THE FRONT AND THE RIGHT FLANK.

THE ENEMY WHO REMAINED IN THE CENTER OF THE BASE CAMP TOOK UP POSITIONS IN HUTS

WHICH WERE ASSAULTED AND DESTROYED.  THE FIRST PLATOON KILLED A CONFIRMED 54

ENEMY IN HUTS, BUNKERS AND SPIDER HOLES, AND THE 2ND PLATOON KILLED 17 ENEMY

ON THE LEFT FLANK.  TACK AIR KILLED AN ESTIMATED 25 FLEEING ENEMY SOLDIERS.  AFTER

THE BASE CAMP WAS SECURED, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN AND MANY VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENTS WERE GATHERED AND ALL LIVESTOCK WERE KILLED.  THREE ENEMY REFUSED TO

SURRENDER AND ONE BROKE AND RAN WHEN AN ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPON FIRED ON THE

SQUAD'S POSITION.  ALL WERE KILLED.  SQUAD LEADERS ATTEMPTED TO DRAG SOME BODIES

OUTSIDE THE HUTS FOR FURTHER IDENTIFICATION, HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO SO

BECAUSE THE BODIES WERE SPREAD ALL OVER THE FLOORS AND WALLS.  INTELLIGENCE

MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM SLEEPING HOOCHES, PASSED TO THE COMPANY COMMANDER

AND THE ASSAULT CONTINUED.  THE FIRST PLATOON TOOK NO CASUALTIES DURING THIS

ASSAULT, AND THE SECOND PLATOON HAD ONLY ONE SCU WOUNDED.  AT THIS POINT, B

COMPANY CONSIDERED THEIR SITUATION CRITICAL AND REQUESTED EXTRACTION.  AS THE

FIRST HELICOPTER ARRIVED AT POINT 16, IT RECEIVED GROUND FIRE FROM A LONG HILL

                                      6

[F-7]

[Fax header:]
06/16/98  TUE 13:27 FAX 9106860074             SHERRY MCCARLEY                     001



TO THE NW AND SW.  THE COMPANY SUPPRESSED THE GROUND FIRE WITH ORGANIC WEAPONS

AND REMAINING AMMUNITION.  THE FIRST TWO CH-53'S WERE ABLE TO LIFT OFF THE LZ

WITH ONLY MINOR DAMAGE POSSIBLY DUE TO CBU-19 BEING USED TO PREP THE AREA.  THE

THIRD SHIP APPARENTLY SUSTAINED DAMAGE WHICH CAUSED IT TO CRASH 15 KILOMETERS EAST

OF THE LZ.  FIVE ENEMY SOLDIERS WHO HAD CRAWLED BACK UP THE HILL AND WERE ON

THE LZ WERE KILLED BY PERSONNEL AS THEY BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT.  ONE SCU WAS FATALLY

WOUNDED AS HE ENTERED THE AIRCRAFT AND ANOTHER SCU WAS KILLED WHEN THE AIRCRAFT

CRASHED.  A CHASE SHIP SUCCESSFULLY RESCUED THE PASSENGERS AND PROCEEDED TO KONTUM

ON 14500 SEP 70.

THE INFORMATION I HAVE JUST PRESENTED WAS OBTAINED BY A COMPLETE INTERROGATION OF

EVERY US AND SCU MEMBER OF THE COMPANY IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN TO CCC.

AS A PLATOON LEADER OF THIS OPERATION, I AM MOST PROUD OF MY OWN US AND SCU

PERSONNEL AND OF THE ENTIRE COMPANY.  WE FEEL WE DID A GOOD JOB.  THE PERSONNEL

WERE AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE.  WE CANNOT SAY TOO MANY GOOD THINGS ABOUT THE AIR

SUPPORT WE RECEIVED. THEY WERE MAGNIFICENT.  WITHOUT THEM OUR JOB WOULD NOT

HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE.

SIR, COLONEL SADLER WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A FINAL WRAP UP ON OPERATION TAILWIND.










                                      7

[End Tab F]

[Tab G]

[G-1]

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF ROBERT L VAN BUSKIRK
JULY 14 1998

Mr. Van Buskirk was contacted by Henry J. Schweiter, OASD/RA, by phone on the afternoon of July 14, 1998. He indicated no one from the government had contacted him before and that while he would be happy to talk to anyone about Tailwind, he would only answer questions about the use of Sarin gas and the sighting of possible defectors if those questions were submitted in advance in writing.

In describing Operation Tailwind, Mr Van Buskirk stated that he believed the operation had been compromised before it began and was a trap. "How could we put two, six-man pathfinder teams on the LZ for 18 minutes with 'all clear', and yet I had 10 percent wounded before we hit the ground? The enemy knew when and where we were coming, and we were completely surrounded." All the helicopters were hit on the way in. He stated that they only got off the LZ because of firepower from the sky. As confirmation, Mr Van Buskirk referred to the first CNN report, which quoted Major General Jack Singlaub as saying that the SOCJ forces were "bait".

Mr Van Buskirk stated that all fourteen living American participants from Operation Tailwind have been located. He said that Sergeant William Scherer and Sergeant Keith Plancich were dead. He mentioned that Gary Matsumoto, a military expert and reporter from Fox News, had succeeded in locating most of the participants.

Mr Van Buskirk said that the account of Operation Tailwind in the book on SOG forces by retired Army Major John L Plaster was highly inaccurate. He said that Plaster was "out to lunch" and that "he was handing out beer as we came out of the helos after the operation was over." He said that the SOG forces on Tailwind did not march 15 miles cross-country, as Plaster claims in his book. "We didn't go 10 football fields from the LZ", Mr Van Buskirk said. "They stomped us for four days. It ain't the way Plaster wrote it."

The amazing thing about Tailwind was that Mr Van Buskirk got all 55 men under his command out alive. He said that from his perspective, his job was to "blow stuff up and keep my men alive." He said that for four days he fired his weapon so often that it took the skin off his trigger finger.

Mr. Van Buskirk specifically addressed the case of Sergeant Michael Hagen, one of his men on Operation Tailwind who is living in poverty with his parents in Los Angeles, California and is paralyzed from the knees down. According to Mr Van Buskirk, he's 100 percent disabled, but he can't get any medicine from the VA because he can't prove he was in country. Mr. Van Buskirk said that Hagen's physician, Dr Baumsweiger (sp?), a neurologist and psychiatrist, can attest to the legitimacy of his disability. He said Hagen could stick a needle through his tongue and not feel anything.

Mr. Van Buskirk volunteered that he had seen Hagen and others "convulsing" when gas was dropped on the SOG forces during Tailwind. He said "I don't think it was CS." He added, "Whatever it was, it worked. Whatever was on the LZ got us out alive." When asked whether

[G-2]

he was familiar with change in CS tear agents used in theater from CBU-19 during the late 1960s to CBU-30, which was deployed in 1970, Mr Van Buskirk replied that he was not. He opined that Sergeant's Plancich's death may have been caused by exposure to the gas--"his heart exploded before he reached age 40."

When asked about possible defectors, Mr. Van Buskirk referred to the script for his briefing to General Creighton Abrams after Operation Tailwind. He said the script referred to three enemy soldiers who refused to surrender, and one broke and ran away. All were killed. Mr. Van Buskirk would only say that the one who ran and the two who were in the "spider hole" were the ones he was talking about.

Mr Van Buskirk stated he disagreed with April Oliver, the CNN reporter, that the camp the SOG forces discovered was gassed before they went in. "CNN got it wrong", he said. He also said he talked to Peter Arnett personally.

Mr. Van Buskirk strongly urged that more interviews be conducted, in particular of former Sergeant Hagen. He expressed a willing [sic] to discuss his experiences with anyone, subject to the restriction that questions about the use of sarin gas and defectors be submitted in writing. He mentioned that when he wrote his book, I knew there was going to be sensitive stuff, so he didn't talk about those things.

[G-3]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

RESERVE AFFAIRS

July 16, 1998

Robert L. Van Buskirk
433 Treasure Way
Rutherfordton, NC 28139

Dear Mr. Van Buskirk:

Thank you for talking with me over the phone the other day about your recollections of OPERATION TAILWIND. I appreciate your candor and willingness to discuss the operation.

During our conversation, you indicated that you would only be willing to answer questions concerning the use of Sarin nerve gas and about sighting Caucasians if those questions were posed in writing I have three questions:

1. Is there anything you want to tell us about the use of Sarin nerve gas during OPERATION TAILWIND?

2. Is there anything you want to tell us concerning the targeting or sighting of U.S defectors or other Caucasians during Operation Tailwind?

3. Are there any other comments about OPERATION TAILWIND you would like the Department of Defense to consider in its review of the operation?

I would be grateful if you would fax your written responses to these questions to me by the close of business Friday, July 17, 1998. My fax number is 703-695-3659.

Thank you for your cooperation, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Henry J. Schweiter
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Manpower and Personnel)

[G-4]

[Fax header:]
JUL-16-98  THU 01:36 PM Bt CAROLINA LAND CORP.   704 286 1774      P.01

[Transcription of hand-printed letter:]

                                               July 16th, 1998

To: Henry J. Schweiter, Deputy Assistant Secretary
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Washington, D. C. 20301-1500

Via: Fax 703-695-3659

Reference: Operation Tailwind

From: Robert L. Van Buskirk, 433 Treasure Way, Rftn, NC 28139

Dear Mr. Schweiter,

     Thank you for your letter - Fax - containing the three

questions you'd like me to answer as part of your investigation

into allegations raised in a recent report by CNN and Time

magazine. After much thought and reflection, as well as rev-

iewing my own notes from several CNN interviews, both on

and off camera; I stand by the record of those inter-

views.

     There are well over a hundred pages of printed

notes and transcripts available to your investigation; I'm

sure through CNN's Tom Johnson and Rick Kaplan, both of 

whom expressed a desire that CNN & the Pentagon do a

joint investigation of the charges raised by the CNN story.

     I further suggest you request the transcripts and notes

concerning Capt. McCarley. And that McCarley might also

release a copy to you of my seven page briefing to General

Abrams and his staff. I was not allowed to keep a copy or

any notes from that briefing, so I was surprised to learn Cpt.

McCarley had provided the press with my briefing.

     Finally, I would like to know if your investigation is

in depth enough to learn: who told the enemy, when and

where we were arriving for Tailwind? It was a trap

which almost succeeded. Finally, I hope Sgt. Hagen and

others who suffer from some type of 'toxic exposure' would

have a 'waiver' or disability to be recognized by the V.A.

I would hope part of your investigation is to help our wounded.

                         Sincerely,

                                  [Signed] Robert Van Buskirk


[Fax footer:]
JUL-16-1998 13:58                 704 286 1774                        P.001

[End Tab G]